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Why do autocratic regimes have sometimes a weak reaction to terrorism, and conversely why do democratic 
regimes sometimes react harshly? More generally, what are the determinants of governments' reaction to 
terrorism? And, what are the determinants of terrorism and of its dynamic? 
In the last years, there have been many empirical studies conducted on these questions. We believe, however, that 
a general theoretical model is missing, which would significantly help empirical research and its interpretation. 
This paper is a first attempt towards the construction of such a general model. In this model, individual human 
capital, government responsiveness and economic development are seen as potential factors influencing individual 
choice to use terrorism as a political strategy. In this paper, we elaborate a strategic model of terrorism with a 
specific focus on domestic terrorism, in which the individual choice of joining a terrorist organization is a way of 
pursing specific political aims. This decision is in turn influenced by the interaction between terrorist' activity, 
political engagement and government policies. We are able to prove that three different political regimes form the 
equilibrium outcomes, and that there is not a simple monotonic relationship between a regime accountability and 
terrorism' repression. It is then also perfectly possible for a democratic regime to harshly repress terrorism and for 
an autocratic polity to be tolerant on terrorism. 
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1.  Introduction 
Why do autocratic regimes have sometimes a weak reaction to terrorism, and conversely why 
do democratic regimes sometimes react harshly? More generally, what are the determinants of 
governments' reaction to terrorism? And, what are the determinants of terrorism and of its 
dynamic? 
In the last years, there have been many theoretical and empirical studies on terrorism in general, 
and on some of these questions in particular. We believe, however, that a general theoretical 
model connecting government accountability, counter-terrorism policies and structural 
parameters is missing. Such a model, should explain not only the observed non monotonic 
relationship between government accountability a strength of counter-terrorism policies, it 
should also connect observable government and terrorists choices to structural exogenous 
parameters, a result that would significantly help empirical research and interpretation. This 
paper is a first attempt towards the construction of a general model that consider individual 
human capital, government responsiveness and economic development as possible factors 
influencing why individual agents might decide to use terrorism as a political strategy to try to 
reach their political goals. In this work, we elaborate a strategic model of terrorism with a 
specific focus on domestic terrorism. In this model the individual choice of joining a terrorist 
organization is a peculiar way of pursuing specific political aims, and the interaction between 
terrorists' activity, political engagement and government policies plays a crucial role. We 
assume that terrorists are utility maximizers that use terrorism when the expected political gains 
minus the expected costs outweigh the net expected benefits of alternative forms of protest. 
Similarly, the government acts to maximize a weighted sum of citizens' utility and of its own 
political goal.  
Within this frame, we are able to show that the terrorist game has three possible equilibrium 
outcomes, uniquely determined by structural parameters:  
1. A repressive regime characterized by  
i.         No terrorism 
ii. High repression 
iii. Increasing protests. 
2. A changing regime5 characterized by  
i.         Low terrorism which might increase or decrease according to the 
ii. Random repressive reaction of the government  
iii. Increasing protests if there is repression. 
3. A tolerant regime characterized by  
i.         High terrorism 
ii. No repression 
iii. No protests. 
In particular, we show that there is not a simple monotonic relationship between regime 
accountability and terrorism’ repression, so that it is perfectly possible for a democratic regime 
to repress harshly and for an autocratic polity to be tolerant of terrorism.  
To stress that these questions and results are relevant, let us consider four countries variously 
affected by terrorism in the last 40 years, with different degree of democratic accountability and 
different government reactions, where our statements are based on  Crenshaw (2001) and 
Whittaker (2012). As democratic countries, consider Italy and Israel. In the seventies the Italian 
government's reaction was first tolerant, then harsh, while Israel always react very harshly to 
any terrorist attack. Two main differences between these two countries are probably the 
intermediate human capital of Italian terrorists, while Palestinian terrorists are characterized by 
high human capital and, above all, the significant high political heterogeneity of Palestinian 
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activists with respect to Israeli citizens. As autocratic countries, consider Nigeria, where the 
government’s reaction to terrorism is sometime weak, sometimes harsh, and Russia, where the 
government reaction has always been extremely harsh. From the point of view of our 
explanatory variables, these countries are significantly different: low economic development in 
Nigeria, significant economic development in Russia, intermediate political heterogeneity in 
Nigeria, high political heterogeneity in Russia, low terrorists' human capital in Nigeria, 
intermediate in Russia. 
 
 
2.  The Model 
2.1 The Structure of the Model 
In the following notation the subscript denotes the role of the player, while the apex denotes the 
time. The model we propose is sequential; at the beginning of each stage all the players are 
informed of the choices made by all players in previous stages and within each stage the players 
play simultaneously. 
2.1.1 The Timing of the Game 
1. FIRST STAGE: The citizens i{1, …, P} are characterized by tastes for a drastic 
change in the government6 i (-,) and human capital Hi  [0, 1],
7 that affects i’s 
productivity in all possible activities, terrorism, political and labor efforts. At this first 
stage, each citizen i{1, …, P} has to decide whether to join one of three different 
groups, i.e. terrorists T1,  political activists A1,  or conservative8 C1,  with the following 
consequences: 
 each i  T1 chooses the terrorism effort Ei =Hi  and thus the labor supply Li = Hi - Ei 
=0;  
 each i  A1 chooses the terrorism effort Ei = ½ Hi  and thus the labor supply Li = Hi - 
Ei = ½ Hi  ; 
 each i  C1 chooses the terrorism effort Ei =0  and thus the labor supply Li = Hi - Ei = 
Hi.  
 Citizen i’s income Yi is determined by the production function f(L)=αL, where α(0, 









1 the number of, respectively, terrorists, activists and 




1 the average number (percentage) of terrorists, activists and 




1 the average human capital of terrorists, activists and 
conservatives at stage 1. 
2. SECOND STAGE: The government G observes (nT
1, nA
1, nC
1) then chooses the amount 







 , the choice of the amount of repression ρ is equivalent to choosing the tax 
rate t  [ 0, 1]. 
3. THIRD STAGE: each citizen i{1, …, P} after observing government repression t, has 
to decide whether to join one of three different groups, i.e. terrorists T2,  political 
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activists A2,  or conservative C2,  with the same consequences of period 1 on citizens’ 
efforts and income. 




2 the number of, respectively, terrorists, activists and 




2 the average number (percentage) of terrorists, activists and 




2 the average human capital of terrorists, activists and 
conservatives at stage 2. 
4. FINAL OUTCOMES: The game ends with two possible final outcomes, Revolution or 
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  Revolutionˆ  




2.1.2 Structural Assumptions 
The Conflict Technology: 
A crucial aspect of this model is the specification of how the players' choices affect the 
probability of Revolution. We assume the following linear conflict technology 
1 2 1 2
1
min 1 ,1 .
i i i i
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
 
This conflict technology represents in the simplest way the idea that the probability of 
revolution increases linearly with the percentage of global terrorists' activity, but is at the same 
time reduced by governments' level of repression. Also, active participation in protests 
increases the likelihood of a revolution, however the effects of such protests is smaller with 
respect to the effect of terrorism acts.9 
Using the previously introduced notation, we can rewrite the probability of successful 
revolution as follows: 
     1 1 2 2 1 1 2 21min 1 ,1 .
2
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To simplify, from now on we take     1 1 2 2 1 1 2 211 1
2
T T T T A A A At n h n h a n h n h     and we will check 
ex post that this inequality is satisfied. 
 
The Players' Payoff Functions 
The final outcome is associate to the following public payoff  
1 if Revolution





which in turn affect the players' payoffs linearly, as follows: 
1. the citizens' utilities are 








   
 
is an individual parameter that describes a citizen's position towards revolution: higher i means 
a high propensity for revolution, while lower i denotes a taste for status quo; 
2.  the government objective function is  
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where  is an index of democratic accountability of the government: the more  goes to 1, the 
more the government is democratic and vice versa. Then the government expected payoff is 
     1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2
1 1
, 1 1 .
2 2
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P{0, …, } Population size 
m  (0, ) Measure of political heterogeneity 
α  (0, ) Measure of political development 
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Citizens’ political position 
  [0, 1] Measure of government’s  
accountability 
hJ
t  [0, 1] Average human capital of 
group J{T,A,C} in period t=1,2 
Endogenous variables 
nJ
t  [0, 1] Percentanges of citizens in 
group J{T,A,C} in period t=1,2 
t  [0, 1] Tax rate established by the 












1. Uniform distribution of citizens’ tastes: i is uniformly distributed; 
2. Increasing heterogeneity with increasing economic development: m > 2α; 
3. Stationary: hC
1= hC




2 = h; 
4. Strong protests a = ½ . 
 
The first condition is just to simplify the calculations. The second condition means that the ratio 
of political heterogeneity of the population over productivity is bounded by the level of 
economic development. This condition is not only plausible but also simply the calculus. The 
stationary condition is useful to get a closed form solution. The stationary condition means that 
the human capital of terrorist and activists is equal, stationary and it is greater or smaller than 
the human capital of conservatives depending on h > ½ . Finally, the fourth condition means 
that activism is quite a strong way to oppose the government. 
 
3. Solution of the Game 
As solution concept, we use Subgame Perfect Equilibria (SPE).  
 
3.1.1 Citizens' Choice in the Second Period 
In the online Appendix, we establish the following result 
Lemma 1 
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The percentages of citizens in each of these three categories is represented in figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 1: citizens’ choices as a function of government policy 
 
3.1.2 Government's Choice 






The sequential best reply of the government is 
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where the intervals can be empty for specific values of the parameters. 
 
3.1.3 First Period Citizens' Choice 
The citizens' sequential best reply in the first period, is characterized by the following lemma, 
which we derive in the Appendix: 
Lemma 3 
The percentages of the groups in the second period are:  
 
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Now we are able to characterize the set of Subgame Perfect equilibria of the terrorist game, as a 
function of the structural parameters. 
 
Proposition 1 
The model is characterized by the following Sub Game Perfect Equilibrium outcomes: 
1. When  
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It is interesting to see that in a tolerant regime there is no repression, which goes at the costs of 
accepting a certain amount of terrorist activity. Additionally, it is interesting to see that in the 
equilibrium we might have repression even if there is no terrorist activity. It is exactly the 
government's repression that avoids terrorism activities. The only situation, in which we see 
both terrorism and repression is when the regime is changing. In these regimes terrorist activity 
triggers repression with a strictly positive probability. 
 
4. Remarks on the results and conclusion 
Proposition 1 has interesting implication on the relationships between terrorism, government’s 
reaction and the structural parameters. In particular 
1. When we have a repressive regime, then  
i. The likelihood of  having this kind of regime is increasing in heterogeneity and 
decreasing in economic development; 
ii. an increment in heterogeneity increases repression and political activism;  







2. When we have a tolerant regime, then  
iv. Its likelihood decreases in heterogeneity and increases in economic development; 
v. an increment in heterogeneity increases terrorism and reduces conservatism;  
vi. an increment in economic development reduces terrorism and increases 
conservatism; 
 
The three political regimes and their properties are represented in the following picture in which 
we use the democracy index   [0, 1] as the independent variable against, respectively, 
terrorists/activists human capital h  [0, 1], the index of economic development α  [0, m/2] 
and the amount of political m  [ 2α, +) . 
 
 
Figure 2: Political regimes, government accountability and terrorists’ average human capital 
 
Figure 3: Political regimes, government accountability and economic development 
 
 







These three figures illustrate the relationship between our explanatory variables and political 
regimes. In particular, we map the government’s accountability with respect to the other three 
explanatory variables, terrorists’ average human capital, economic development and citizens’ 
political heterogeneity. In particular, they show the role of terrorists’ human capital and of 
citizens’ political heterogeneity in increasing the possibility of a repressive regime, as well as 
the role of economic development in increasing the possibility of a tolerant regime. One 
particular result that is worth emphasizing is that figure 4 shows that even a highly democratic 
government might react with repression to an increase in the population political heterogeneity, 
while figure 3 shows that a reduction in economic growth or, as shown in figure 2, an increment 
in the terrorist education increases the likelihood of a repressive political regime. These results 
help to provide tentative answers to our starting questions: 
1. Autocratic regimes have sometimes a weak reaction to terrorism and, conversely, 
democratic regimes react sometimes harshly because government's accountability towards 
citizens. However, this accountability is just one determinant of the strength of the reaction, 
other crucial factors are economic development, terrorists' human capital and, crucially, 
political heterogeneity; 
2. more generally,  important determinants of governments' reaction to terrorism are  
i. the government’s accountability towards citizens: the greater accountability, the 
smaller the likelihood of harsh repression  
ii. the level of economic development: the more developed is a country, the smaller the 
likelihood of harsh repression 
iii. the terrorists' human capital: the greater terrorists' human capital, the greater the 
likelihood of harsh repression 
iv. the level of political heterogeneity: the greater political heterogeneity, the greater the 
likelihood of harsh repression; 
3. finally, terrorism activity is increasing with political heterogeneity, decreasing with 
economic development and decreasing with government repression. 
 
To conclude, if we go back to the four countries we proposed as case studies, we can collocate 
these countries in previous figure 4 in terms of the democracy index and of political 
heterogeneity. The yellow points with the country denominations, show how our results can 
help to explain the differences in their counter-terrorist policies. 
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